Safety analysis is an algorithm for determining if a term in an untyped lambda calculus with constants is safe, i.e., if it does not cause an error during evaluation. This ambition is also shared by algorithms for type inference. Safety analysis and type inference are based on rather di erent perspectives, however. Safety analysis is global in that it can only analyze a complete program. In contrast, type inference is local in that it can analyze pieces of a program in isolation. In this paper we prove that safety analysis is sound , relative to both a strict and a lazy operational semantics. We also prove that safety analysis accepts strictly more safe lambda terms than does type inference for simple types. The latter result demonstrates that global program analyses can be more precise than local ones.
Introduction
We will compare two techniques for analyzing the safety of terms in an untyped lambda calculus with constants, see gure 1. The safety we are concerned with is the absence of those run-time errors that arise from the misuse of constants, such as an attempt to compute p true. In this paper we consider just the two constants 0 and succ. They can be misused by applying a number to an argument, or by applying succ to an abstraction. Safety is undecidable so any sound analysis algorithm must reject some safe programs. E ::= x j x:E j E 1 E 2 j 0 j succ E Figure 1 : The lambda calculus.
One way of achieving a safety guarantee is to perform type inference 16]; if a term is typable, then safety is guaranteed. We propose another technique which we shall simply call safety analysis; it is based on closure analysis (also called control ow analysis) 11, 19, 3, 20] and does not perform a type reconstruction. We prove that this new technique is sound and that it accepts strictly more safe lambda terms than does type inference for simple types. These results are illustrated in gure 2.
We also present examples of lambda terms that demonstrate the strictness of the established inclusions. Safety analysis may be an alternative to type inference for implementations of untyped functional languages. Apart from the safety property, type inference also computes the actual type information, which may be useful for improving the e ciency of implementations. Safety analysis similarly computes closure information, which is also useful for improving e ciency. Type inference for our lambda calculus can be implemented in linear time (there is no polymorphic let). Safety analysis can be implemented in worst-case cubic time.
In practice, a program is an abstraction, e.g., x:E. The program x:E takes its input through the variable x and it yields the value obtained by evaluating the body E. Any analysis of such a program should take all possible inputs into account. For technical reasons we will assume that lambda terms to be analyzed take their input through the free variables. This means that if a program x:E is to be analyzed, then we will analyze only E where indeed the free occurrences of the variable x corresponds to input. For example consider the program x:if x < 0 then {x else x (It is written in a larger language then the one that we later give a formal treatment). If this program is to be analyzed, then we will analyze only if x < 0 then {x else x
The assumption about taking input through the free variables is convenient when de ning constraints on the inputs. This is because the notion of free variable is independent of the form of the lambda term to be analyzed. Henceforth we assume that all lambda terms already have been put into the appropriate form. Safety analysis and type inference are based on rather di erent perspectives. Safety analysis is global in that it can only analyze a complete program that takes only rstorder values as inputs. In contrast, type inference is local in that it can analyze pieces of a program in isolation. Our comparison of the two techniques thus demonstrates that a global program analysis can be more precise than a local one.
That safety analysis can only analyze programs that take rst-order values as inputs is of course a limitation. In practice, however, one can represent higher-order input as a rst-order data structure. This is for example done in Bondorf's partial evaluator Similix 3, 4] and in Gomard and Jones' partial evaluator Lambda-mix 9]. The former partial evaluator is applicable to a higher-order subset of Scheme and the latter to a lambda calculus with constants. Similix for example contains a parser that transforms Scheme programs into a rst-order representation.
One advantage of a local analysis is that it is modular (or incremental) in that new routines can be added to a program without creating a need to re-analyze the program. If a complete program is to be analyzed, however, then the greater precision of safety analysis may provide a safety guarantee in situations where type inference fails to do so. Safety analysis may in practice be most useful in a language such a Scheme that use run-time tagging and tag-checking, rather than type inference. If a safety guarantee is provided, then the run-time tag-checks can be eliminated. We will present safety analysis is two steps. First we will present a basic form of the analysis which like type inference analyzes all subterms of a given term. Then we extend this analysis with a device for detecting and avoiding the analysis of dead code. Dead code is a subterm of a given term that will not be evaluated during neither strict nor lazy evaluation. For example, in x:00 the subterm 00 is dead code. The extended safety analysis will accept all abstractions, such as x:00, since the body is dead code.
Avoiding the safety analysis of dead code may be useful in practice. For example, if a program uses only a small part of a large library of routines, then only the routines actually used need to be analyzed. This saves time and avoids possible type errors in routines that are never called. The basic safety analysis may be interesting in itself, if, as we conjecture, this analysis is sound with respect to arbitrary -reduction. Although we treat only the two constants 0 and succ, the safety analysis technique and our results can be generalized to handle arbitrary constants. For technical reasons it is convenient for succ to always require an argument; if desired, a combinator version can be programmed as x:succ x. Polymorphic constants can be treated in a manner similar to how we treat lambda abstractions.
In the following section we recall the de nition of type inference, and in section 3 we introduce the de nition of safety analysis. In section 4 we give the soundness proofs for safety analysis, and in section 5 we give the proof of comparison of safety analysis and type inference.
Type Inference
The most common notion of practical type inference, with which we shall compare our safety analysis, is type inference for simple types. Polymorphic let could be treated by doing syntactic expansion before the type inference. Kannellakis, Mairson, and Mitchell 13, 15] proved that although this expansion may exponentially increase the size of the program, no type inference algorithm for polymorphic let has better worst-case complexity. Such expansion could similarly be performed before a safety analysis.
::= j Int j 1 ! 2
Figure 3: Type schemes.
A straightforward presentation of simple type inference, due to Wand 22] , is as follows. First, the lambda term is -converted so that every -bound variable is distinct. Second, a type variable E] ] is assigned to every subterm E; these variables range over type schemes, shown in gure 3. Third, a nite collection of constraints over these variables is generated from the syntax. Finally, these constraints are solved. The constraints are generated inductively in the syntax, as shown in gure 4. We let TI denote the collection of constraints for all subterms.
Phrase: Constraint:
x:E Figure 5 : TI constraints for ( y:y0)( x:x).
Safety Analysis
Safety analysis is based on closure analysis 19, 3] (also called control ow analysis by Jones 11] and Shivers 20] ). The closures of a term are simply the subterms corresponding to lambda abstractions. A closure analysis approximates for every subterm the set of possible closures to which it may evaluate 11, 19, 3, 20] . The basic form of safety analysis, which we present rst, is simply a closure analysis that does appropriate safety checks. This safety analysis is essentially the one used in the Similix partial evaluator 3]. Having presented this basic analysis, we proceed by extending it with detection of dead code. This involves the notion of a trace graph. The safety analysis algorithms share many similarities with that for type inference. First, the lambda term is -converted so that every -bound variable is distinct. This means that every closure x:E can be denoted by the unique token x. Second, a type variable E] ] is assigned to every subterm E; these variables range over sets of closures and the simple \type" Int. Third, a nite collection of constraints over these variables is generated from the syntax. Finally, these constraints are solved. Safety analysis and type inference di er in the domain over which constraints are specied, and in the manner in which these are generated from the syntax. In a previous paper 18] we successfully applied safety analysis to a substantial subset of the object-oriented language Smalltalk 8] , demonstrating how to deal with inheritance, assignments, conditionals, late binding, etc.
The Basic Safety Analysis
In the remaining we consider a xed lambda term E 0 . We denote by lambda the nite set of all lambda tokens in E 0 . In the constraint system that we will generate from E 0 , type variables range over subsets of the union of lambda and fIntg. The constraints are generated from the syntax, see gure 6. As a conceptual aid, the constraints are grouped into basic, safety, and connecting constraints.
Phrase: Basic constraints:
x:E Figure 7 : SA constraints for ( y:y0)( x:x).
Detection of Dead Code
Dead code is a subterm of a given term that will not be evaluated during neither strict nor lazy evaluation. Intuitively, dead code may be found near the leaves of syntax trees, since both strict and lazy evaluation are \top-down" evaluation strategies. We will now extend the basic safety analysis such that it detects at least some dead code and avoids analyzing such code. Our approach to the detection of dead code is essentially to add conditions to some of the constraints yielded by the basic safety analysis. This makes it more likely that the constraint system has a solution, thus more terms will be deemed safe. We will explain the addition of conditions by means of a trace graph. To de ne that we need the auxiliary notion of local nodes in a parse tree for an arbitrary lambda term E. We shall call a parse tree node local in E, if it can be reached from the root of E's parse tree without passing through a lambda abstraction. This is illustrated in gure 8. We can then de ne trace graphs. Intuitively, the nodes correspond to functions and the edges correspond to possible applications.
De nition 3.2:
The trace graph associated with a lambda term E 0 is a directed graph with: Edges. For each trace graph node N, if E 1 E 2 occurs in N, then there is a directed edge from N to every trace graph node for abstractions (but not to main). Notice that from a node there is an outgoing edge for each local application. Edges are labeled by conditions and connecting constraints, as follows. If an edge is yielded by the application E 1 E 2 and the edge leads to the node for the abstraction x:E, then the edge is labeled with the condition x 2 Notice that the number of edges is at most quadratic in the number of nodes. 2
The trace graph for the term ( y:y0)( x:x) is shown in gure 9 (omitting connecting constraints to avoid clutter). From a trace graph we derive a nite set of global constraints. Intuitively, this set is the union of the constraints for every potential \top-down" evaluation sequence. A potential \top-down" evaluation sequence is represented in the trace graph by a path from the main node. Such a path is illustrated in the following gure which omits the constraints to avoid clutter:
The constraints that we derive from this path are:
x 1 2 Y 1^: : :^ x n 2 Y n ) local connect where local are the local constraints of the nal node ( y n ) and connect are the connecting constraints of the nal edge ( y n?1 ?! y n ). Notice that there may be in nitely many paths from the main node. Many of them yield redundant constraints, however, namely those where a condition appears more than once. Thus, we derive constraints for only those paths that use edges at most once. This yields a nite constraint system which is solvable if and only if the constraint system generated from all paths is solvable. Notice also that the constraints can be normalized in linear time to a set of constraints of the form: We let SA R (R for Reachability) denote the global, nite constraint system. We let CA R denote the subset of SA R where the safety constraints are excluded. Figure 10 : SA R constraints for ( y:y0)( x:x).
the nal conjunct of the conditions on connecting constraints. Only a subset is obtained, because the constraints for dead code may not appear at all in SA R . It follows that if SA R is solvable, then so is SA.
The set of global constraints for the term ( y:y0)( x:x) is presented in gure 10. Notice the similarities and di erences from gure 7 which shows the SA constraints for the same term. As an example of a term that is accepted by safety analysis with detection of dead code, but is rejected without, consider x:00. In the trace graph there is no edge from main, so the unsafe application 00 is unreachable. This is re ected in the global constraint system that only consists of the one constraint x:00] ] f xg. Clearly, this constraint system is solvable.
Solving Constraints
We now sketch a cubic time algorithm that computes the minimal solution of an SA constraint system or decides that none exists. We also indicate how it can be modi ed to handle detection of dead code. The input to the algorithm is a nite set of constraints where each constraint is of one of the forms: C V , V V 0 , V C, and c 2 V ) V 0 V 00 , where c is a lambda token, C is a set of lambda tokens, and V; V 0 ; V 00 are variables. Notice that there are O(n 2 ) constraints if n is the size of the lambda term from which the constraint system was generated. The algorithm has two phases. In the rst phase, each constraint, except those of the form V C, are inserted in a data structure Solver. Notice that when we omit the constraints of the form V C, then the remaining constraints do have a solution. In the second phase we extract from the Solver the minimal solution of the inserted constraints and check whether the constraints of the form V C are satis ed.
During the process of inserting constraints, the Solver represents the minimal solution of the constraints inserted so far. The implementation of the solver uses a directed graph, henceforth called the graph.
Nodes of the graph correspond to type variables; and Edges of the graph correspond to inclusions between type variables.
Graph nodes and type variables are in one-to-one correspondence. The graph node for a type variable represents the set of lambda tokens which the type variable currently is assigned. We represent a set of lambda tokens as a bitvector with an entry for each lambda token.
With each entry in the bitvectors we associate a list of constraints of the form V 0 V 00 . We use this list to handle insertion of constraints of the form c 2 V ) V 0 V 00 , as explained below. The organization of a graph node can be illustrated as follows. The idea behind the graph is that when a lambda token is inserted into a set, then all inclusions are automatically maintained. This involves propagating bits along edges. When a bit becomes set, each constraint in the associated list is removed and inserted into the Solver. Initially, each graph node represents the empty set, and all lists of constraints are empty.
We will now consider how to insert constraints.
First, consider a constraint of the form C V . We union the set C to the bitvector of the graph node of V , maintain all inclusions, and recursively insert the constraints that are contained in the lists associated with newly set bits.
Second, consider a constraint of the form V V 0 . We create a graph edge from the node of V to the node of V 0 , and do maintenance of inclusions and recursive insertion like in the previous case.
Third, consider a constraint of the form c 2 V ) V 0 V 00 . If the set for V contains c, then we recursively insert the constraint V 0 V 00 into the Solver. Otherwise we insert V 0 V 00 into the list associated with the bit for c in the graph node for V .
With this implementation of the Solver, the overall time complexity of inserting the O(n 2 ) constraints into the Solver is O(n 3 ) where n is the size of the lambda term from which the constraint system was generated. To see this, rst observe that each bit is propagated along an edge at most once. Since there are O(n 2 ) edges, the overall cost of maintaining inclusions is O(n 3 ) time. Since the remaining work is constant for each constraint, and since there are O(n 2 ) constraints, we arrive at O(n 3 ) time.
In the second phase of the algorithm we extract in O(n 3 ) time the minimal solution from the Solver and we check in O(n) time if the constraints of the form V c are satis ed. In total, the algorithm runs in O(n 3 ) time.
To handle detection of dead code, we modify the rst phase of the algorithm as follows.
The idea is to mark each trace graph node as either dead or live. Initially, only the main node is live.
We extend the Solver with the operation live-trace-graph-nodes. With this operation we can extract the set of trace graph nodes that so far has been marked live. The algorithm also uses a variable L which holds a set of trace graph nodes. The algorithm is as follows:
2. Insert all constraints from the main node into the Solver. The Solver maintains a bitvector representing the set of trace graph nodes marked live. We let each conditional constraint carry the lambda token of the potentially invoked lambda abstraction. Each insertion operation in the Solver can then maintain the set of live trace graph nodes as follows. If we insert a constraint c 2 V ) V 0 V 00 into the Solver and the condition c 2 V at some point becomes satis ed, then the potentially invoked trace graph node is marked live.
Clearly, the modi ed algorithm runs in O(n 3 ) time.
Soundness
We now show that safety analysis is sound, i.e., if a term is accepted, then it is safe. We show the soundness with respect to both a strict (call-by-value, applicative order reduction) and a lazy (call-by-name, normal order reduction) semantics of the lambda calculus. For simplicity, we prove the soundness of safety analysis for only closed terms. To see that neither of the strict and lazy cases imply the other, consider the two lambda terms in gure 11. Applicative order reduction of the rst yields an in nite loop, whereas normal reduction of it yields an error. In contrast, applicative order reduction of the second yields an error, whereas normal reduction of it yields an in nite loop. Thus, the soundness with respect to one of the reduction strategies does not imply the soundness with respect to the other.
1) ( x:err)(loop) 2) ( x:loop)(err) where err = 00 and loop = , with = ( x:xx) Figure 11 : Two lambda terms.
The two semantics of the untyped lambda calculus will be given as natural semantics 12, 7] , involving sequents and inference rules. The two proofs of soundness have the same structure, as follows. First, the soundness of environment lookup is proved by induction in the structure of derivation trees. Second, the soundness of closure analysis of a term in a so-called E 0 -well-formed environment is proved by structural induction. Third, the E 0 -well-formedness of all environments occurring in a sequent in a derivation tree is proved, by induction in the depth of sequents. From these lemmas, the soundness of closure and safety analysis easily follows. We give the proofs for the safety analysis extended with detection of dead code. This result immediately implies the soundness of the basic safety analysis.
Strict Semantics
We present in gure 12 a strict operational semantics which explicitly deals with constant misuse. An evaluation that misuses constants yields the result wrong. The semantics uses environments and values, which are simultaneously de ned in gure 13.
The entire soundness argument is for a xed lambda term E 0 , in which each -bound variable is distinct. Proof: We proceed by induction in the structure of E S . In the base, we consider x, 0, and succ E. First, consider rule 2, the one for x. Since `x : v is active, so is `v al x : v, and the conclusion follows from lemma 4.1. Second, consider rule 7, the one for 0. Since `0 : 0 is active, the constraint 0]] fIntg is satis ed, so abs( 0]]; 0). It is immediate that 0 is E 0 -wf. Third, consider rules 8 and 9, those for succ E. If rule 9 has been applied, then the conclusion is immediate. If rule 8 has been applied, then we use that `succ E : v is active to conclude that the constraint succ E] ] fIntg is satis ed, so abs( succ E] ]; succ n+1 0 ). It is immediate that succ n+1 0 is E 0 -wf. In the induction step we consider x:E and E 1 E 2 . First, consider rule 3, the one for x:E. Since ` x:E : < x:E; > is active, the constraint x:E] ] f xg is satis ed, so abs( x:E] ]; < x:E; >). To prove that < x:E; > is E 0 -wf, we apply the induction hypothesis to E, from which the conclusion is immediate.
Second, consider rules 4, 5, and 6, those for E 1 E 2 . If rule 5 or 6 has been applied, then the conclusion is immediate. If rule 4 has been applied, then we use that `E 1 E 2 : v is active to conclude that also `E 1 : < x:E; 1 > and `E 2 : w are active, and that w 6 = wrong. By applying the induction hypothesis to E 1 and E 2 , we get that < x:E; 1 > and w are E 0 -wf, and that abs( E 1 ]]; < x:E; 1 >) and abs Proof: Let there be given a w and a derivation tree for`m ain E 0 : w. It su ces to prove that for all n 1, the sequents in distance n from the root are active and have environment components that are E 0 -wf. We proceed by induction in n.
In the base, we observe that only one sequent has distance 1 from the root, see rule 1. The expression in this sequent occurs in the root node of the trace graph, so the sequent is active. Its environment component is ; which is E 0 -wf.
In the induction step, we consider the rules 2,4,5,6,8,9, and 11. In each case we assume that the conclusion sequent is active and has an environment component that is E 0 -wf.
We must then prove that the same holds for the hypothesis sequents. Consider rst the six cases excluding rule 4. They all have one hypothesis sequent, and in all cases its expression occurs in the same trace graph node as the expression of the conclusion sequent. Hence, the hypothesis sequent is also active. In cases 2,5,6,8, and 9, the environment components of the conclusion and hypothesis sequents are identical, so, in particular, that of the hypothesis sequent is E 0 -wf. In case 11, it is also immediate that the environment component of the hypothesis sequent is E 0 -wf. Now, consider rule 4. It is immediate the rst two hypotheses are active and have environment components that are E 0 -wf. Then notice that in the trace graph there is an edge from the node containing E 1 E 2 to the x:E-node, labeled with the condition x 2 
Lazy Semantics
We present in gure 15 a lazy operational semantics which explicitly deals with constant misuse, as did the strict semantics. There is no rule number 6, to keep the numbering consistent with that in the strict semantics. Figure 16 : Environments and values.
The semantics uses environments and values, which are simultaneously de ned in gure 16 .
The new sort of value is that of thunks, de ned in case 2.d in gure 16. Thunks are used to capture that the evaluation of arguments can be delayed and later resumed. In the semantics, thunks are introduced in rule 4, and eliminated using rules 12 and 13. The two last rules may be understood as de ning an operation`res' which evaluates a lambda term to a non-thunk value. Notice that rules 1, 4, 5, 8, and 9 use the`res' operation. The soundness argument uses the same terminology as in the strict case. We only need slight modi cations of the notion of activeness, the predicate abs( ; ), and the notion of E 0 -well-formedness, as follows. A sequent `r es E : v may be active in the same way as Proof: We proceed by induction in the structure of E S . In the base, we consider x, 0, and succ E. Case 1) is proved in the same way as the base case of lemma 4.2. To prove case 2), we consider the rules 12 and 13. If rule 12 has been applied, then the conclusion follows from case 1). If rule 13 has been applied, then it follows from case 1) that E 0 ; 0 ] Case 2) is proved in the same way as case 2) in the base case above. 2
Note that lemma 4.3 still holds, with only a few simple changes to proof which we leave to the reader. The soundness of the closure analysis is in the lazy case expressed as follows. The soundness of safety analysis, theorem 4.5, also holds in the lazy case. The proof is the same, mutatis mutandis.
Comparison
We now show that safety analysis accepts strictly more safe terms than does type inference for simple types. We will do this by proving that for every lambda term E 0 , if the TI constraint system for E 0 is solvable, then the SA R constraint system for E 0 is solvable.
The proof involves several lemmas, see gure 18. The main technical problem to be solved is that SA R and TI are constraint systems over two di erent domains, sets of closures versus types schemes. This makes a direct comparison hard. We overcome this problem by applying solvability preserving maps into constraints over a common two-point domain. The entire argument is for a xed lambda term E 0 . It is su cient to prove that if the TI constraint system for E 0 is solvable, then the SA constraint system for E 0 is solvable.
The main result then follows, since if SA is solvable, then so is SA R . We rst show that the possibly conditional constraints of SA are equivalent to a set of unconditional constraints (USA). USA is obtained from SA by repeated transformations.
A set of constraints can be described by a pair (C; U) where C contains the conditional constraints and U the unconditional ones. We have two di erent transformations: a) If U is solvable and c holds in the minimal solution, then (C fc ) Kg; U) becomes (C; U fKg).
b) If case a) is not applicable, then (C; U) becomes (;; U).
This process clearly terminates, since each transformation removes at least one conditional constraint. Note that case b) applies if either U is unsolvable or no condition in C is satis ed in the minimal solution of U. can inherit this solution.
It follows that solvability is preserved for any sequence of transformations. 2
We now introduce a particularly simple kind of constraints, which we call 2-constraints.
Here variables range over the binary set f ; Intg and constraints are all of the form X = Y , X = , or X = Int.
We de ne a function which maps USA constraints into 2-constraints. Individual constraints are mapped as follows:
It turns out that preserves solvability. We conclude that safety analysis is at least as powerful as type inference for simple types.
Theorem 5.8: Every lambda term accepted by type inference for simple types will also be accepted by both the basic and the extended safety analysis.
Proof: We need only to bring the lemmas together, as indicated in gure 18, and combine them with the observation from section 3 that if the SA constraint system for a lambda term is solvable, then so is the SA R constraint system for that term. 2
We now show that both the basic and the extended safety analyses accept strictly more lambda terms than type inference for simple types.
Theorem 5.9: There exists a safe term that is accepted by the basic safety analysis but rejected by type inference for simple types.
Proof: The basic safety analysis accepts all terms without constants. Some of them are rejected by type inference for simple types, for example x:xx. 2.
It is easy to see that the safety analysis extended with detection of dead code accepts all terms in normal form that has no safety errors at the outermost level. Type inference for simple types rejects some of these terms, for example f:(f ( x:x))(f 0).
We contend, naturally, that the extra power of safety analysis will be signi cant for numerous useful functional programs. The above proof also sheds some light on why and how safety analysis accepts more safe terms than type inference. Consider a solution of TI that is transformed into a solution of SA according to the strategy implied in gure 18. All closure sets will be the maximal set lambda. Thus, the more ne-grained distinction between individual closures is lost. The results are still valid if we allow recursive types, as in the -calculus 2]. Here the TI constraints are exactly the same, but the type schemes are changed from nite to regular trees. This allows solutions to constraints such as X = X ! Int. Only lemma 5.4 is in uenced, but the proof carries through with virtually no modi cations. Type inference with recursive types will, like the basic safety analysis, accept all terms without constants.
Still, it does not accept for example f:(f ( x:x))(f 0).
We conclude this section with two example terms that do not have simple types, not even if we allow recursive types, and that are not pure terms or in normal form. The rst term is:
( y:y)( f:(f ( x:x))(f 0)) This term will be accepted by the basic safety analysis, hence also by the extended safety analysis. The second term is: ( f:(f ( x:x))(f 0))( y:y) This term will not be accepted by either safety analysis. To see why, observe that no code in this term is dead. Hence, it is su cient to show that the SA constraint system for the term is unsolvable. Consider then the following subset of this constraint system: f:(f( x:x))( Since this is impossible, the SA constraint system is unsolvable, hence the term ( f:(f ( x:x))(f 0))( y:y)
will not be accepted by safety analysis.
Conclusion
We have presented a new algorithm, safety analysis, for deciding the safety of lambda terms. It has been proved sound and strictly more powerful than type inference for simple types. The latter result demonstrates that the global safety analysis is more precise than the local type inference. Safety analysis is sound for both lazy and strict semantics, but not for arbitrary reduction strategies. For example, the term x:00 is accepted by safety analysis, but will cause an error if 00 is reduced. We conjecture, however, that the basic form of safety analysis, without detection of dead code, is sound for -reduction.
The algorithm for safety analysis can be implemented in cubic time, by a slight modi cation of Ayers' algorithm 1]. This shows that safety analysis realistically can be incorporated into a compiler for an untyped functional language. Type inference has been used as the basis of binding time analysis 9]; so has closure analysis 3]. We hope to use the techniques presented here to formally compare the quality of these analyses. There are other type systems for the lambda calculus, for which type inference is possible.
In particular, we think of partial types 21, 17, 14] and simple intersection types 5].
Neither encompasses constants in its present form, but this should be easy to remedy. We hope to extend gure 2 by proving more containment results involving these systems.
